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Abstract: 
The growing contrast and contradiction between the processes of radicalization and democratization 
in the age of global market reforms and the ‘War on Terror’ are not confined to the internal or 
domestic Moroccan political scene. Political movements, NGOs, the government, international 
institutions and foreign governments are all embedded within a growing number of international 
networks thus making policy a global enterprise. In the following article we want to examine the 
impact of US policy on the Moroccan reform process. The background for this analysis is George W. 
Bush’s Greater Middle Eastern Initiative. This US initiative is ambitious as it tries to devise policies 
that tackle what is seen as the root causes for Middle East instability, violence and/or Islamism. 
Morocco is seen as one of the US’s strategic allies in the region and has been solicited to join the 
‘War on Terror’. Morocco is an interesting case to study simultaneously the impact of  the ‘War on 
Terror’, the implementation of a Free Trade Agreement and good governance measures as political 
tools to counter terrorism through fighting poverty and, finally, the ‘Islamist question’ particularly 
present in Morocco. 
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Resumen: 
El creciente contraste y la contradicción entre los procesos de radicalización y democratización en 
la era de las reformas del mercado global y la “Guerra contra el Terror” no se limitan a la escena 
política interna de Marruecos. Los movimientos políticos, las ONG, el gobierno, las instituciones 
internacionales y los gobiernos de otros países están todos implicados en un creciente número de 
redes internacionales, que hacen de la formulación de políticas una empresa global. En este artículo 
pretendemos examinar el impacto de la política estadounidense en el proceso de reformas marroquí. 
El antecedente de este análisis es la Iniciativa del Gran Oriente Medio de George W. Bush. La 
iniciativa estadounidense es ambiciosa, ya que intenta crear políticas que ataquen lo que se percibe 
como causas de la inestabilidad, violencia y/o islamismo en Oriente Medio. Marruecos es visto como 
uno de los aliados estratégicos de EE.UU. en la región, y se le ha pedido que se una a la “Guerra 
contra el Terror”. Marruecos es un caso interesante para estudiar simultáneamente el impacto de la 
“Guerra contra el Terror”, la implementación de un Acuerdo de Libre Cambio y las medidas de 
buen gobierno como instrumentos políticos para combatir el terrorismo por medio de la lucha contra 
la pobreza, y finalmente, la “cuestión islamista” particularmente presente en Marruecos.  
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Introduction 
Confronted with budgetary and financial constraints, growing political opposition, mounting 
social unrest and personal illness, late King Hassan II set out on a genuine path of political 
reforms during the 1990s. Liberating political prisoners, closing ‘secret’ detention centres, 
introducing new legislation in accordance with the idea of human rights, bringing the parties 
of the ‘historical opposition’ into government, Morocco seemed well underway of becoming 
an authentic democratic system. The pace of political, social and economic reforms even 
accelerated in the first years after Mohammed VI ascended the royal throne. By the end of the 
1990s, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch argued that Morocco had 
dramatically improved its human rights record. On top of that, the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions lauded Morocco as being one of the ‘success-stories’ of 
global market reform.  
The story of the Moroccan exception – an Arab politically moderated country with 
‘controlled Islamists’ and absence of political violence – with its emphasis on a ‘new concept 
of authority’ and free elections was shattered to pieces on May 16th 2003 when suicide attacks 
killed 40 Moroccan citizens while aiming at Jewish and Spanish targets in Casablanca. 
Surely, since 9/11, Morocco was confronted with the same questions as most of the world’s 
nation-states. The King and the Moroccan political elite explored the boundaries of law and 
policy to counter radicalization and prevent terrorist violent attacks while trying to secure the 
pace of political reform.   
The growing contrast and contradiction between the processes of radicalization and 
democratization in the age of global market reforms and the ‘War on Terror’ are not confined 
to the internal or domestic Moroccan political scene. Political movements, NGOs, the 
government, international institutions and foreign governments are all embedded within a 
growing number of international networks thus making policy more a “global enterprise 
rather than simply a national one”.3 In this article we want to examine the impact of US policy 
on the Moroccan reform process. The background then for this analysis is George W. Bush’s 
Greater Middle Eastern Initiative. This US initiative is ambitious as it tries to devise policies 
that tackle what is seen as the root causes for Middle East instability, violence and/or 
Islamism. Morocco is seen as one of the US’s strategic allies in the region and has been 
solicited to join the ‘War on Terror’. Morocco is an interesting case to study simultaneously 
the impact of ‘War on Terror’, the implementation of a Free Trade Agreement and good 
governance measures as political tools to counter terrorism through fighting poverty and, 
finally, the Islamist dilemma particularly present in Morocco.  
In this article we first want to describe the advent of the project of reform – locally 
known as alternance – as it will enable us to isolate and understand the specific and particular 
characteristics of the Moroccan experience. Secondly we address the issue of Islamism that is 
raising both domestically and internationally important questions. Sequentially we will 
describe which ‘brand’ of Islamism has been part and parcel of the logic of alternance, which 
type of Islamism has been kept outside the realm of political reform and, finally, how violent 
Islamism (jihadism) has been treated as a ‘danger’ to Moroccan democratization. Thirdly, and 
finally, we will assess in what ways the agenda of good governance pursued by the US and 
international institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund…) and the 
implementation of a Free Trade Agreement have been incorporated into the logic of the ‘War 
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on Terror’. We will argue that there are inherent contradictions between the discourse and 
practices of good governance and the logic of genuine democratization – understood as a 
political system in which responsible citizens participate freely in the decision-making 
process that is geared towards general welfare.  
 
1. Bringing about alternance : the search for consensus 
From the beginning of the 1990s, late King Hassan II promoted and tested the idea of  ‘home-
grown’ democratization, locally referred to as alternance. The end of the Soviet Union, 
continuous problems surrounding the Western Sahara, an economic and social malaise, 
growing oppositions and urban revolts, his deteriorating health, and the pressure of the EU 
and other international institutions … all had an influence on the King’s decision to start a 
process of opening the political system.  
Several speeches in the first years of the decade made clear that Hassan’s wish was to 
bring the so-called historical opposition of the nationalist movement – unified in the Koutla 
al-demouqratiyya or Democratic Block  – into government. This was to be complemented 
with the installation of a political and economic order based on the rule of law. The Koutla 
became entrenched in a paradoxical situation in the sense that they advocated democracy for 
decades when rather suddenly the King started referring to that same rhetoric. One of the 
central institutional problems Morocco faced (and one could say up until today) was the 
relationship and interaction between the Palace and the political parties (mainly from the 
Koutla). This is particularly evident in the possibilities of power-sharing.  
The King proposed three times throughout the 1990s – through his official speeches – the 
offer of alternance.4 Thus the opposition parties and the King (through the Ministry of 
Interior and counsellors) started a process of talks. It is fair to speak of ‘exchanges’ in the 
sense that we weren’t witnessing a real dialogue or negotiation. Negotiation implies some sort 
of symmetrical exchange of ideas and propositions between more or less equal partners. The 
talks ended symbolically with another royal address to the Nation in January 1995 when the 
King nominated technocrats without real political affiliation to lead the government.  
The parties from the Koutla had no real impact on the content or form of the process as 
the King held the reigns of the debate; a debate that neither the parties nor the parliament 
influenced significantly. Instead, the political parties (including the Koutla) resorted to non-
institutionalised forms of political action by joining ‘informal talks’ with the Ministry of 
Interior. The political parties were only able to propose measures and ideas while the King, 
through his Minister of Interior and Moroccan and French experts, took the real decisions in 
the cabinet’s shadow. The talks centred on the issues of constitutional reforms, general 
liberties and freedoms, the accountability of the government and the organisation of free and 
transparent elections.5 On all these issues the political parties, labour organisations and/or 
                                                          
4
 In his royal address of October 8th 1993, Hassan II offered the political parties (and especially the Koutla) to 
‘take up its responsibilities’ towards the expectations of the Moroccans in the face of the economic and social 
crisis. The King reiterated more or less the same offer about a year later, on the 14th of October 1994. Between 
this day and January 11th 1995, a lot of exchanges took place between the King and his counsellors, the Minister 
of Interior and the political parties from the opposition. 
5
 Three main issues divided the Palace and the parties. First of all, the opposition wanted that the indirectly 
elected members of parliament (1/3 of the MP’s appointed by the King) would be dismissed. The second issue 
concerned the organisation of free, fair and transparent elections. The parties of the opposition accused the 
administration of the Ministry of Interior of continuously rigging the elections, even those of 1993. The third 
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civil institutions were only able to give their opinion. Thus, the King was more than a 
mediator.  
In the debates from 1992 onwards, the key issue was a search for consensus. It was 
obvious that the consensus’s terms equated largely with the King’s wishes. Between the 
constitutional changes of 1992 and the organisation of the so-called historical ‘foundational 
elections’ of 1997, the political parties were caught within a dynamic to whichthey could not 
really contribute.  
The debate’s focus was foremost on the ‘rules of the game’, i.e. the institutional rules that 
most political actors could accept to constitute a ‘legitimate’ political field based on a 
consensus. The constitutional referenda of 1992 and 1996 expressed small concessions of the 
King towards the parties.6 By 1996 the Koutla accepted the new constitution and ordered its 
constituents to vote favourably. On the 13th of September 1996, 99.57% of the Moroccan 
electors (with a turnout of 83%) voted in favour. The success of this constitutional reform was 
not so much the new constitution itself but the fact that the Koutla did not boycott it. Indeed, 
up until 1996, the Koutla pleaded for a constitutional assembly that would write up a new 
constitution in total independence, something the monarchy never accepted previously (and 
never would). By ‘ordering’ a constitutional revision, the King succeeded in ‘hijacking’ the 
Koutla’s demands. Thus, the King reassumed control over the alternance initiative. The new 
constitution included important but still small concessions to the Koutla and demonstrated 
that the King blocked development towards a more autonomous parliament and government.7 
Another point of discussion until 1996 was the organisation of ‘free and transparent’ 
elections and the accountability of the government towards the parliament (instead of to the 
King). The Koutla protested against the results of the 1993 elections, accusing the Ministry of 
Interior of fraud and rigging the outcome. In this tense climate, the King nominated a 
government of national unity, something the Koutla could only accept. But new divergences 
surfaced when the King nominated not only the so-called ministers of sovereignty (ministries 
deemed important to the monarchy: interior, foreign affairs, justice and Islamic affairs) but 
also the Prime Minister outside of the electoral outcome. Even though the opposition parties 
opposed this, the King set out to form a government of technocrats under the premiership of 
Abdou Filaly-Ansari. By 1996-1997 the Koutla understood that the only way to really 
participate in the system was to acknowledge the fact that the King held the major political 
playing cards. Thus, incrementally, they accepted the idea of a government of transition that 
epitomized ‘alternance’. In 1997 the Koutla won the elections but could not ensure a real 
majority within parliament.   It thereby opened the way to a coalition government that could 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
issue, the most important one, centred on the Ministry  of Interior. All parties of the opposition demanded overtly 
the dismissal of Driss Basri. It is mainly the last issue that brought an end to the proposition of 1994. The King 
could not accept to oust Basri, as he constituted the central pawn in the King’s power structure and control over 
polity and society. Both parties and King were disappointed in the failure but, as the King reiterated in his 
address, this was only temporarily. He stressed the fact that sooner or later he would succeed to bring the 
opposition into government.  
6
 In 1992 the concessions seemed so small that the Koutla called for a boycott. This was a boycott that the 
administration “forgot to calculate” in its results when it proclaimed a participation of more than 97%. The 1996 
constitutional reform oversaw the introduction of a second chamber – something the Koutla was asking for – but 
the prerogatives of the first chamber were curtailed as the King decided that the second chamber would be 
elected indirectly and have more or less the same legislative prerogatives than the first. 
7
 El Mossadeq, Rkia (1995): “Les labyrinthes de l’alternance au Maroc”, Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, tome 
XXXIV, p. 715-727.  
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not be strong.8 Abderrahman Youssoufi, leader of the USFP, was appointed Prime Minister in 
February 1998 after he had ensured the prerogative to nominate the Ministers of foreign 
affairs and Justice, while he had to concede that Driss Basri would remain Minister of 
Interior, a position he held since 1974.  
After the death of Hassan II, Mohammed VI further enlarged the democratic reference 
and wanted to show his well-intended policy with some spectacular decisions, the most 
important being the dismissal of Driss Basri from the Interior ministry. Besides that, he 
encouraged freedom of the press, launched several social programs which earned him the title 
of “King of the poor.”  However, after two years in power, foreign observers and Moroccans 
alike saw that the young king was more or less replicating his father’s techniques of power 
brokerage. As usual; dissent was allowed to a certain extent but when it crossed an arbitrary 
‘red line’ repression could be used (as in the case of the trials of several journalists) or the 
King could utilize his special prerogatives (as in the case of the reform of the Mudawanna). 
Central to any democratic transition is rendering the political authorities more 
accountable to its citizens, something that has not happened in Morocco as the foundations of 
formal political authority remain fluid, ambiguous and relative. Mohammed VI promised to 
inaugurate a new concept of political authority based on personal freedom, human rights and 
the rule of law. But this initiative has not been translated in reality. One of the major obstacles 
to this remains the monarchy’s constant bypassing of formal decision-making processes and 
institutions, thus reproducing the monarchy’s central role in major political issues.9  
 
 
                                                          
8
 Some observers think that the outcome of the elections was ‘tailored’ to the King’s wishes by the Minister of 
Interior so as to tri-polarize the parliament in a centre, right and left block. Indeed, the King had expressed that 
wish in a royal discourse (11-10-96) saying that the alternance would be the outcome of a political fight between 
“two camps – I did not say two parties – and a centre”. See El Mossadeq, Rkia (1996): “La réforme 
constitutionnelle el les illusions consensuelles”, Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, tome XXXV, p. 573-582. 
9
 Two such examples are the dismissal of the Minister of Interior, Driss Basri and the end of Yacine’s house-
arrest. Throughout 1999 rumours spread through the antechambers of politics in Rabat and the royal compound 
or mechouar concerning the difficult relationship between the new king and his Minister of Interior. Finally, 
Mohammed VI dismissed Driss Basri and replaced him by a tandem consisting of Ahmed Midaoui and one of 
his acolytes Fouad Al-Himma, chef of the royal cabinet. All this took place when Prime Minister Youssoufi was 
on official visit in Europe, who got the news when personal friends called him on his mobile phone. Youssoufi 
was never informed of the plan or of the appointment of Midaoui and Al-Himma. The removal of Basri cannot 
be underestimated. Symbolically, Basri carried the weight (even more than the king himself) of years of 
repression especially in the 1970s. Institutionally, the Ministry of Interior is the central modern locus of the 
King’s power. It was through the Ministry that the king established the ‘modern wing of the makhzen’. The 
‘quadrillage administratif’ expanded total control over the population during years. With the ousting of Basri, 
the Ministry would play a much lesser role in controlling society. This does not necessarily mean that 
Mohammed VI was pursuing political liberalisation. Rumours indicate that Basri, along with elements within the 
army were more in favour of another member of the royal family becoming king (See Leveau, Remy: “The 
Moroccan Monarchy: A Political System in Quest of a New Equilibrium”, in Kostiner, Joseph (ed.) (2000): 
Middle East Monarchies. The Challenge of Modernity, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.122). The same 
mechanism of bypassing the government’s prerogatives and/or formal institutions was witnessed when sheikh 
Yacine’s house-arrest was lifted. Sheikh Yacine, leader of the Islamist movement of al-‘Adl wa al-Ihsan, was 
freed May 2000 after 10 years. Nobody really knows who or how the ban was lifted. A rather baffled Minister of 
Human Rights declared on 2M (an Moroccan TV station broadcasting in French) that ‘His Majesty’ made this 
possible. To which he added promptly that the return of long-time exile, Abderrahman Serfaty, and the freeing of 
political prisoners were all decisions taken by the King himself. These decisions prompted journalists to ask 
what role the government and especially the Ministry of Human Rights was playing then and whether it had 
anything to say. It was clear that the Minister could not answer the question straightforwardly. 
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2. The War on Terror and the Islamist question 
Just like all countries in the region; Morocco has witnessed the birth, growth and success of 
Islamist oppositional movements. The Islamist question refers today to several questions. 
Firstly, it refers to the idea that if there would be genuine free and transparent elections in the 
MENA region, then the Islamist parties would come out as victors. Promoting democracy and 
free elections can thus lead to the coming to power of movements and parties that both 
domestic and international political actors and organisations are reluctant to admit as partners. 
Before Islamist can win elections however, they have to be able to participate. This is 
dependent on the regime’s policy towards them. The process of containing (or managing) 
Islamism (or radical political opposition) through the political process is the crux of the 
Islamist question.  
Incorporating the former militants of the jama’a islamiyya into the process of alternance 
through their entrance in electoral competition was a success for the monarchy’s inclusive and 
consensual approach of the new political game. Not only did it bring a part of the oppositional 
voice within the realm of legitimate politics, but it also used the party as a force of 
stabilisation during a period of economic and social changes. Indeed, one can argue that in 
times of rapid social and economic change in the age of reforms and globalization, the 
Islamists popularity can channel and satisfy the need for integration and stability. Albeit the 
fact that the popular – some observers would say more popular – movement of sheikh Yacine 
al-adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality), stayed and was kept out of the formal political 
arena, the strategy seemed successful. The attacks of Casablanca have, however, suggested 
that containing radicalism through the political process would not suffice to counter the 
growing amount of political and social unrest10. Since then the King has devised new policies 
towards Islamists, Jihadi-groups and, more generally, the religious field itself. 
In what follows we will discuss firstly how the Islamists entered the realm of politics 
while Yacine remained outside this process. Secondly we will analyse the direct political 
impact of the Casablanca attacks on the level of general freedoms, the (political) position of 
the PJD and the other political formations. Thirdly, we will then  describe how the King, 
much like his father 20 years earlier, has tightened his control over the organisation of Islam 
in the country. Finally we address the specific issue of jihad-violence in the Kingdom. 
 
3. The emergence of the Islamists in politics 
For some time now, Islamists in Morocco have participated in the political process, but they 
did not play a direct role in the debates surrounding the question of alternance. The Islamists 
were growing in power in Morocco since the 1980s and one specific group, the jama’a al-
islamiyya of Abdellilah Benkirane, was pursuing political participation since the second half 
of the decade. Nevertheless, they could not make their debut on the political stage until the 
late 1990s. Benkirane saw his official requests for the creation of an Islamist party been 
turned down twice in 1989 and 1992.11 Despite this failure Benkirane still believed that the 
only way to gain an official and formal recognition was to compete in the elections. After the 
refusal of recognition as a political party Benkirane changed the name of the movement into 
                                                          
10
 Willis, Michael: “Containing radicalism through the Political Process in North Africa”, Mediterranean 
Politics, Vol.11, No.2 (July 2006), p.137-150  
11
 In 1992 his request was officially rejected while three years earlier the authorities simply did not react to his 
demand. 
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Al-Islah wa al-Tajdid (Reform and Renewal). In 1996 the movement changed its name again 
into Harakat al-Tawhid wa al-Islah (Movement of Unity and for Reform). The name changes 
were induced by internal discussions on the movement’s new political strategies and ideology 
and the incorporation of independent Islamic think-tanks and Islamic cultural organisations 
into the movement. Knowing fully well that this was still a movement and not an official 
political party, Benkirane developed a new strategy. Being aware of the slim chance of getting 
official recognition, he searched for contacts with members of other political formations to 
ensure some sort of free electoral. Benkirane found the ideal partner in the Mouvement 
Populaire Constitutionel Démocratique (MPCD, Popular Constitutional and Democratic 
Movement) of Dr. Khatib, the ex-leader of the Moroccan Army of Liberation. It was a 
pragmatic choice that had several advantages. First of all, Benkirane knew fully well that the 
party was nearly extinct and that the discussions with its leadership would not be too difficult. 
Since 1965 the MPCD found itself in a deadlock and for Dr. Khatib it could be a welcome 
opportunity to play once again a relevant role in the political game. Secondly, the MPCD had 
always possessed a conservative Islamic imprint, something that brought the two formations 
ideologically closer to one another. Thirdly, Benkirane knew that an alliance with Dr. Khatib 
would only be possible if the King accepted. Dr. Khatib had close personal ties with the 
monarchy. If the deal would succeed, Benkirane and the Islamists knew that they would 
become somehow ‘protected’ by that deal.     
The first contacts between Dr. Khatib and Benkirane dated back to 1992 but it is only in 
1996 that an alliance formalized. During those years Benkirane made sure that within the 
Islamist realm there was a clear majority for political participation while Dr. Khatib awaited 
the palace’s reactions. Both Benkirane and Dr. Khatib claimed that there was neither 
interference nor a dictate from the palace. It is hard to believe, however, that in a climate of 
successive political change under the wings of an all controlling monarchy, Benkirane’s 
Islamists could have entered the legal political system without a tacit or explicit palace 
approval. It was Benkirane who initiated the project while Dr. Kathib just added two 
conditions for the Islamist to join an alliance with his party, i.e. the recognition of the 
monarchy’s legitimacy and the respect for the constitution. The Islamists entered parliament 
in 1997 winning nine seats and due to partial elections and some defections in other parties 
they ended the legislature with 14 members. Later the MPCD changed its name into the Party 
of Justice and Development (PJD). In 2002 the PJD became the third biggest party in 
parliament, winning 42 seats in the 2002 elections. 
The change in the monarchy’s strategy vis-à-vis the Islamists during the 1990s can be 
seen as pragmatic turn in the process of political transition in Morocco. The moderate PJD 
converted itself in a typical opposition party respecting the rules of the game, avoiding mostly 
the direct confrontation with the regime. Over the years the PJD established an equilibrium 
between the demands of their base and the demands of the monarchy, channelled through the 
office of the Ministry of Interior, Moustapha Sahel. The integration (or cooptation) of the 
Islamists into the political realm was a success for both parties. On the one hand the Islamists 
had the opportunity to get rid of their clandestine status and induce political and social change 
through parliament. On the other hand their entrance in politics enhanced the monarchy’s 
ability to control their activities and strategies while, at the same time, a legal Islamist party 
could steal a march on more radical movements.    
The political strategy of the PJD forms an important part of the Moroccan transition 
process. The monarchy wishes a liberalisation of the political system, without losing its 
control over politics. Hassan II and after him Mohammed VI chose to integrate the Islamists 
in the political realm in order to be able to control a possible centre of opposition in times of 
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economic and social crisis. As long as the PJD does not cut across the directives of the 
monarchy, it will be allowed to grow and possibly even participate in the government.  
 
4. The impact of the Casablanca bombings 
Although the regime increased its control over society after 9/11, it was not until the attacks 
on Casablanca on May 16th 2003 that the reversion to the old policies of repression and 
authoritarianism were accelerated. The bombings of Casablanca caused a shockwave within 
the regime and Moroccan society which had important consequences for the future of the 
political transition process in Morocco.  
First of all, an anti-terrorism law that had been pending before parliament since January 
2003 was suddenly quickly enacted.  Indeed, it took less than two weeks after the attacks, on 
the 29th of May, to pass the Law to Combat Terror (Bill 03.03), in spite of the many concerns 
activist organizations such as Human Rights Watch and other domestic movements uttered 
about the deterioration of the basic human rights.12 The broad definition of terrorism in the 
new law gave the regime the opportunity to deal with all of its adversaries in the name of 
justice and national security. One year after the attacks, Minister of Justice Bouzoubaâ stated 
that 2112 Islamists had been charged in connection with those events and that 903 persons 
had been convicted, of whom seventeen were sentenced to death.13  
Secondly, not only the Islamists experienced harsh repression but also the media did not 
escape the new power grip of the regime. According to a report of Human Rights Watch on 
Morocco, the controversial new law reversed many of the press freedoms only recently 
enforced by the revised 2002 Press Code.14 The attacks gave the government legitimate 
reasons to restrict the power of the media. Article 41 of the anti-terror legislation set stricter 
limits on and penalties for speech offences, all in the name of national security and Moroccan 
territorial integrity. The regime tried to regain its control over the media through their 
dependence of subsidies, advertising allocation, stricter regulation and licensing procedures15.  
Thirdly, alongside the massive arrests, the events in Casablanca gave the opportunity for 
certain elements within the security apparatus and the political field to sharpen their control 
over the PJD. Afraid of dismantlement the PJD abandoned its ambitions to win massively in 
the local elections of September 2003. The leadership of the party organized around Saad 
Eddin al-Othmani, Abdellilah Benkirane and Daoudi clearly opted for a non-confrontational 
strategy towards the regime, while other members – rallied around the president of the 
parliamentary group, Mustapha Ramid – and chose to denounce the interference of the 
Ministry of Interior. In fact, the Islamists left it to the regime to decide in which areas it could 
compete in the elections and which candidates were to be allowed to participate. This 
submissive attitude of the Islamist party provoked much discontent among its grassroots 
supporters. In September 2005, Mustapha Ramid, had to resign from his position as president 
of the parliamentary group of the PJD, fearing that his presidency would endanger the future 
of the party. At the same time though, the King, Mohammed VI, pronounced several 
discourses in which he made plain his belief that a new law on the organisation of political 
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 Human Rights Watch (2004), “Morocco: Human Wrights at a Crossroads”, Human Rights Watch 
Publications, Vol.16, No.6(E), p.26, in: http://hrw.org/reports/2004/morocco1004/morocco1004.pdf.  
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 Ibid., p.25.   
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 Ibid.  
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parties was necessary. Finally the King also tried to re-establish his central role in the 
religious affairs of the country.  
 
5. Islam against terror? 16 
The Casablanca attacks allowed the King to re-establish his authority over domestic politics in 
different areas. After having ‘managed’ the PJD’s participation to the 2003 local elections, the 
King reorganized the religious field. The Moroccan monarch has always claimed autonomy 
on the religious field as commander of the faithful and sole representative of Islam. With the 
recent reaffirmation of the monarchy’s central position, the King hopes to counter extremist 
tendencies and assert his control of the religious field. Mohammed VI announced various 
religious reforms stressing the fact that these reforms were carried out to assure the tolerance 
of Moroccan Islam. Just like his father in the first years of the 1980s, Mohammed VI has 
reduced the role of the mosque as a public space (opening them only for prayer), controlled 
the Friday sermons, and, even more importantly, has heightened control over the Conseil 
Supérieur des Ouléma in discussing and delivering fatwas.  
The Moroccan King, the government and several opinion makers stressed that the 
terrorist attacks of Casablanca, just as 9/11 or other attacks, were not part of Islam. The image 
that the Moroccan government is portraying of Islam is one of openness and tolerance. As the 
King put it:  
This terrorist aggression is against our tolerant and generous faith. Even more so, the 
commissioners and the executioners (of these acts) are wretched criminals who cannot claim 
to be part of Morocco or authentic Islam, because they ignore the tolerance which 
characterizes this religion.17  
The King has re-iterated on numerous occasions that the threat is not inherently 
Moroccan but that is imported! Therefore, he argues, Islam cannot be used for projects of 
hatred and war, as the Moroccan identity is distinctively tolerant. Throughout his speeches 
since 2003, King Mohammed VI has stressed the fact that Moroccan Islam is per definition 
tolerant and non-violent. “Being the religion of the just middle, it reposes on tolerance, 
honours human dignity, advocates (peaceful) coexistence and rejects aggression, extremism 
and the quest for power in the name of the religion”.18 Furthermore, the Moroccans, through 
their adoption of the Maliki rite are flexible and open to the reality in which they live.  
According to the King, Moroccans have always stressed their Muslim identity through 
open negotiations with local cultures and other civilizations by using the imaginative effort of 
ijtihad. Therefore, asks the King, “Is it […] necessary for the Moroccan people, empowered 
by the unity of its religious rite and the authenticity of its civilisation, to import foreign 
ritualistic rites to its own traditions?”19 He does not elaborate on what exactly these ‘foreign 
rites’ are or who imports them. The vague description of “something foreign” that threatens 
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the national security and identity is a powerful heuristic device to create unanimity and a 
sense of the need to protect “national security”.  
And if this was not enough, Mohammed VI further warns the Moroccan public:  
We will not tolerate these, the more so as these doctrines are incompatible with the specific 
Moroccan identity. To those who think to make themselves mouthpieces of a rite foreign to 
Our people, We will oppose them with a vigour that is dictated by the task to preserve the 
uniqueness of the rite of the Moroccans, reaffirming Our will to defend our choice of the 
Maliki rite, while at the same time respecting those of the others, each people having its 
specificities and made its own choices.”20  
And if their would be any misunderstanding on what the concept of jihad actually means; 
the King ‘proposes’ the following meaning:  
Because Islam rests on an invitation to peace, security and concord, the Moroccans have 
understood that the jihad, in its noble acceptation, is a struggle against all malefic 
temptations within humankind and against errors and chaos. Jihad is also an effort of 
imagination and emulation of good deeds. This religious and historic engagement, 
perpetuated by the power of the baia (allegiance), has been actualised through a modern 
political and constitutional pact through which the Umma has been unanimous to consider 
Islam as the state’s religion and the King as the Commander of the Faithful.21 
 
6. Jihad and violence in Morocco: a new challenge 
The investigations of Moroccan and Spanish police agencies revealed that on Moroccan 
territory a Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM) served as a “breeding ground” 
for the interests of al-Qaeda. Moroccan authorities and the political elite as well as public 
opinion reacted with astonishment when the connections between jihadi-combatants in 
Tangier, Casablanca, Madrid, Paris and London were unravelled. The myth of a “Moroccan 
exception” in the Arab world (a stable and peaceful country, “controlled” Islamists, the 
absence of violence and a certain degree of democratisation) could no longer be upheld. Since 
the beginning of the War on Terror, and certainly after the Casablanca attacks, the Moroccan 
regime fell back more and more on ‘classic’ repressive methods to contain the terrorist threat. 
In 2004 international and Moroccan human rights organisations repeatedly sounded the alarm 
about the current evolution. In the name of counter-terrorism the authorities performed 
random arrests, frequently combined with torture. The significant progress made in Morocco 
during the last fifteen years concerning the human rights seemed to be reversed in one year 
time. 
The Salafiyya Jihadiyya, blamed for the Casablanca attacks, is the name of the loosely 
organised network of radical clerics, individuals and/or local groups practicing an extremist, 
radical and very conservative form of Islam. These individuals and groups are ‘outside 
society’ in more then one way. Coming largely from the sub-proletarian shanty-towns on the 
fringes of the big urban areas, they live in the places where the state has never really been 
present. Having no real stake in it, these groups reject the Moroccan state as such and aim to 
live according to their own understanding of Islam, which, to a large degree, is nothing more 
than a strict code of what is allowed and what is prohibited, what is hallal and haram. The 
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violent actions of the group are not so much part of a political strategy to influence specific 
policy or to gain control over a territory. Rather, the violence is connected to the global ‘War 
on Terror’, the war in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a metaphysical manner.    
 
7. The PJD from local to national power? 
Since 2003 elected members of the PJD are in power in cities like Meknes, Khenifra and 
Temara. The local elections of 2003 took place a few months after the attacks in Casablanca.  
In practice the record of the PJD at the local policy level is rather positive. In Meknes, 
one of the biggest cities of the country, the new mayor seems to dispose of a certain amount 
of respect and credibility (regardless of the appropriate political opposition). Aboubakr 
Belkora, son of a rich landlord, has first of all reorganized the finances of the city by means of 
reducing unnecessary expenses and increasing the revenues. Since the righteousness of the 
PJD members is their most important political asset, corruption has been seriously punished 
and favouritism has not been tolerated. It is said that the mayor even denied a concession of a 
territory to Moulay Ismael, the King’s nephew, because the file wasn’t complete and correct. 
Ahmed Belkoura also declared to the Moroccan press that: 
An Islamist policy does not exist, there is only a good or a bad policy. A good policy is 
based on transparency, honesty and competence. And that is what we do. You can determine 
the results of this policy yourself by walking through the city 22. 
Good policy is also the central point of attention of Lahcen Chakira, the mayor of 
Khenifra. The former  physics teacher, and now head of the PJD local council in a city that is 
known for its promiscuity did not deliver himself of a moralizing policy vis-à-vis prostitution, 
but rather concentrated on the social and economic projects form the bulk of decision making 
in Khenifra.  
The PJD seems to connect with the population in different villages and cities in a clear 
and efficient manner. With its‘policy of proximity’ the PJD devotes itself to social and 
economic problems in a professional and efficient manner. Furthermore the party does not 
avoid the use of modern theories of human resources management. The integrity and the 
professionalism of the elected members are two important earmarks of a PJD that wants to 
show that it is ‘ready’ to govern at the national level also.  
The first successes of the PJD already aroused the suspicion of other political actors, 
including the monarchy. Here and there several trivial, local issues degenerated into greater 
political crises. It wasn’t always clear whether this was caused by mismanagement of the PJD 
or by deliberate efforts to discredit the party. At any rate, the PJD turned into a people’s party, 
with its own cells and departments. The party has its leaders, militants and members who 
actively participate in every debate at all policy levels (from the lowest echelons to the central 
policy organs) and by that it has given proof of its maturity.  
However the growth of the PJD would have never been possible without the approval of 
the Makhzen, the political and administrative apparatus surrounding the monarchy governing 
the country. The PJD is possibly an Islamo-democratic party but as such, the party is 
confronted with her limitations and dilemmas. To fulfil the provisions and demands of the 
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Makhzen and the monarchy, the PJD must persevere in a conciliatory political strategy. Both 
on the national level as on the local level the PJD makes sure that it does not cut across the 
interests of the authorities. The new anti-terrorism law, against which several human rights 
organisations have railed, was unanimously approved by parliament. The PJD doesn’t talk 
about a revision of the constitution anymore (like other opposition parties) that would be 
necessary to redefine the role and the place of the King and the monarchy in the Moroccan 
polity. Everything points to the fact that the PJD cast aside most of his oppositional logic in 
exchange for a role in the political game. Therefore many Moroccan observers believe that the 
Makhzen succeeded in ‘taking the sting out of the party’, through which it ended up in a 
pattern of notabilisation. Others assume that that the PJD reflects a broadening and a 
deepening of the Moroccan democracy with her acceptance of the rules of the game.      
But this policy also takes its toll. For two years now the party has held important debates 
about the future. One part of the movement wishes to take part in government via the 
elections in 2007. Another faction, although they find government participation ideologically 
opportune, fears the loss of the party’s independence should this occur. In the meantime the 
monarchy looks suspiciously at every evolution within the Islamist party and makes sure the 
PJD stays within the borders of the permitted political freedom.  
Many see this, correctly, as an attempt of the King to convert the PJD into one of the 
many political formations in the country loyal to the monarchy. If the PJD loses its status of 
independence, it will likewise lose the confidence of the people, who will turn to other 
political parties. But it is unlikely that the King will let this possibility come to such a pass. 
His most important objective was all along precisely to channel a part of the dissatisfaction in 
the country, that mainly arose as a result of economic liberalisation, via the legalisation of the 
PJD.  
 
8. Free trade and good governance against terror? 
Finding a way between the local democratic appeals of parties and civil society organisations, 
securing a strategic alliance with the US in the ‘War on terror’ and opening up the market is 
generally not a recipe for good governance, let alone for a democratic brokering of power and 
interests. In Morocco this dynamic led to the signing of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on 
June 2004. The FTA with the US was definitively placed within the framework of the War on 
Terror. The FTA had explicitly political and strategic goals as the consequence of the new 
international political realm after 9/11. Robert Zoellick, the US trade representative in charge 
of the negotiations stated at numerous times that trade was a new tool in the War on Terror: 
Step by step, the Administration is working to build bridges of free trade with economic and 
social reformers in the Middle East. Our plan offers trade and openness as vital tools for 
leaders striving to build more open, optimistic, and tolerant Islamic societies23 
USAID stresses the importance of the US-Moroccan diplomatic alliance and Morocco’s 
positive track record in implementing general reforms: 
A model of tolerance in the Arab world, the Kingdom of Morocco is the United States’ 
oldest friend in the region and was recently declared to be a major non-NATO ally. Under 
the leadership of King Mohammed VI, this stable, moderate Arab nation is undertaking a 
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series of bold economic, political and social reforms to improve the quality of life for all 
Moroccans. Formidable challenges still face the nation, including an under-performing 
economy and high levels of unemployment and illiteracy. USAID helps address those 
challenges with programs that contribute to an educated and democratic society successfully 
competing in the global marketplace.24. 
US foreign aid to Morocco has mainly an economic focus. No direct political and 
democratic reforms are enforced by the US government although all kinds of training 
programs for parliamentary representatives, judicial personnel and civil society workers are 
funded and organized. The reasons for these policies of economic reform and indirect training 
programs are various.   
First of all, the US does not want to endanger its strategic alliance with Morocco by 
forcing political reforms on the monarchy. Morocco is an important partner in the War on 
Terror. As USAID stresses: “the Kingdom of Morocco is the United States’ oldest friend in 
the region”. The economic approach has above all the intention to secure the stability of the 
monarchy and it lowers the barrier for the regime to sustain its powerbase. An example can be 
found in the fact that the Moroccan regime used the War on Terror as a justification for a 
partial return to repressive and authoritarian policies with the blessing of the United States.25 
Therefore we could argue in part that the US foreign policy approach vis-à-vis Morocco has 
strengthened the regime’s grip on society. Or, as Fransceso Cavatorta states: 
… it emerges that the external intervention to change the cost-benefit analysis of the 
domestic actors is not always intended to support democracy. At times it is intended to stifle 
it. […] it is worth noting that peace and stability are not necessarily achieved through the 
spread of democracy or liberal values. Quite the opposite appears to be the case in the 
Moroccan example. The use of realist concepts can account for the anti-democratic impact of 
foreign policies towards Morocco. The stalled democratization of the country cannot be 
solely laid at the door of the international community, but the actions undertaken by external 
actors have strengthened the current regime with their focus on economic openness and 
façade democratic elections.26. 
This became very clear in December 2002 when the Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI) was launched. The initiative foresaw in the financial support of civil society 
organisations a political transition that was seen as a gradual process:  
There is nothing in MEPI to frighten incumbent regimes and make them fear that the Bush 
administration is out to overthrow them. The United States was not planning “to abandon 
longtime allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia because of their lack of democracy” but 
would offer “positive reinforcement for emerging reform trends,” explained an 
administration official. But if the goal of MEPI was to appease the anger against the United 
States that existed at all levels in the Arab world, it failed.27 
This bottom-up vision on democratization ensured that external constraint was not a 
central factor in the US pressure on Arab regimes. The NGOs that were candidates for 
receiving funds were those who were not seen as being a threat to the regime. Organisations 
with a clear Islamic agenda fell outside the scope of funding possibilities.  
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Secondly, the US also struggles with an Islamist question. The question that confronts the 
US government is very clear:  
Should the United States exert pressure on Arab governments to open their political systems 
and respect human rights with the knowledge that Islamists, the most popular opposition 
force in Arab politics, stand to benefit from regional democratization?28  
There is little doubt that this question has affected US policy towards the Arab World 
since the end of the Cold War. Currently the Islamists are the most important opposition 
movements and the United States have every reason to suspect that if these movements come 
into power, they could undermine US interests in the region. To quote Cavatorta again, we 
could stress that this US attitude vis-à-vis the Islamists 
is not dictated by a principled policy of defending democracy and human rights, although the 
justification for it is sometimes presented in that way. Rather, it is dictated by the necessity 
to avoid having a party in power that would question the fundamental tenets upon which the 
current international system is built.”29 
The idea behind US and USAID policies is as simple and transparent as it can get. The 
economic opening of Morocco would help to alleviate the extreme poverty – considered as a 
breading ground for extremism and violence – in which some segments of the population live. 
Economic growth, it is believed, will encourage and support peace, stability and mutual 
understanding while, at the same time, ushering a new period of internal political, economic 
and social reforms.  
The implementation of the FTA also pressed and demanded for internal reforms that were 
cast in the up-to-date jargon of the international financial institutions. The World Bank 
MENA development report summarizes what good governance is all about: 
The goal of good governance is to maximize the well-being of the public (in two words: 
human development) through the promotion of strong economic growth and material 
satisfaction of basic needs, protection of rights such as liberty, and expression and freedom 
of choice30.  
To achieve good governance “technically solid institutions and mechanisms that function 
effectively” are required but “it cannot exist without respect for some core human values 
recognized and celebrated everywhere”31. Furthermore, good governance rests on two core 
values, i.e. inclusiveness and accountability. Even though the World Bank acknowledges the 
fact that good governance in itself may not generate economic growth it is still a prerequisite 
for development as good policies with ‘bad governance’ is nothing more than a “historical 
accident”32. This effectively echoes Washington’s new vision on the necessity of importing 
democracy in the region.  
‘Good governance’ and the free market became metaphors for all institutions and 
governance aspects designed to support market-led development and parliamentary 
democracy in stead of “any mode of public decision-making that helps to advance human 
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welfare, however conceived”33. Governance is more a technique of coordination, negotiation 
and decision-making and decision-taking. Governance comes from the sphere of economy, 
from the idea of corporate governance of big firms. Therefore, from the onset, governance has 
“an a-political nature, operating along the lines of the instrumental logic of the market, 
inducing a sectorialization and fragmentation of action. It is marked by a technocratic 
tropism”34. The a-political character of governance is presented as 
a remedy allowing increased interaction between the State and civil society, engaging 
horizontal negotiations based on cooperation, with the participation of partners who are 
stakeholders on equal footing (which is illusory because some partners are more equal than 
others, according Orwell’s metaphor), including the public administration, that takes part in 
it and leaves its statute of representing the general interests of the citizens behind35. 
The problem is thus that there is an incongruity between governance and democratic 
government. In Third World countries (or developing states) governance is seen as the “the 
technique or mode of conduct of public policy that is concomitant with the State’s reform. 
One of the effects would be the acceleration and/or consolidation of the process of 
democratization”36. Rousseau argues convincingly that the presupposed relationship between 
governance and democratization is some sort of a ‘contradiction in adjectives’37. It seems to 
her that the principal goal of governance is rendering two contradicting requirements 
compatible. “On the one hand governance tries to induce pluralism in order to strengthen and 
improve the political action of the state, while, on the other hand, it seems to lessen or 
minimize pluralism by reducing its useless aspects for the sake of efficiency”38. The tension 
between the two dynamics induces a new relationship with authority.  
If we keep in mind this contradiction between ‘good governance’ reforms and 
democratization, it becomes possible to apprehend the stalemate that faces Arab reforms in 
general, and the Moroccan case in particular, as much more than ‘simple’ authoritarian 
reactions of power-elites and regimes who unwilling to give up power. Real democratization 
would entail a loss of efficiency which could make the international donors impatient and 
even decide to refrain from help in the future. On the other hand, a fully fledged acceptance 
and implementation of good governance policies would inevitably lead to less 
democratization in the sense that an ever growing amount of citizens will not be able to 
participate in the debates concerning the organization of the economy, the distribution of 
wealth, the organization of labor. All this became evident in the process of negotiation 
between the Moroccan and US trade representatives, as it reflected the Moroccan political 
situation in which foreign policy issues are the realm of the Palace. The negotiations were led 
by the Taïeb Fassi-Fihri, minister delegate of foreign affairs, who is directly accountable to 
the King and is thus not a politician but a technocrat. All political parties (including the 
reformist Islamists of the PJD) remained silent on the issue which was generally seen as a 
royal prerogative.  
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What was, however, new were the first signs of dissent and oppositional voices voiced by 
the media and civil society organisations. The first limits of the impact of the free trade 
agreements on freedom became painfully clear on January 28th 2005 when a peaceful sit-in on 
front of the Parliament was harshly repressed by the police.  
One of the central problems with the growing amount of technical decision-making is the 
fact that those individuals and groups connected to the technical discussions of the 
implementation of market reforms under good governance have access to the benefits of the 
reforms through mobility of travel and communication. Individuals and groups who do not 
have the same connections or forms of knowledge and thus cannot participate in global 
governance discussions remain on the fringes of its presumed benefits. Those groups remain 
dependent on the State’s services at the moment the latter is forced to cut budgets and 
decrease social services.  
 
9. New political arenas in a global world 
This rather pessimistic view should not obfuscate the growing possibilities for societal actors 
to inscribe themselves in local and global networks that heighten their leverage and possibly 
enhance their power in local politics. Global discourses – understood as discourses with 
universal of global references – are translated into the logic of local conflicts and/or problems.  
While Islamists have a central stake in the issue of political reforms as they are the largest 
oppositional political current and because they elicit international attention, there are other 
political expressions that are altering the meaning of politics within the Kingdom under 
current globalization. Through the interaction between domestic political decisions of the 
monarchy and the government and the international constraints more and more referring to 
democratization and good governance, the boundaries of political discourse and actions have 
expanded and the rules of the political game have changed. Political parties (including the 
Islamists as we have seen) or movements, civil society organisations or NGOs all have 
“integrated universalist rhetoric with national and very local popular concerns to mobilize 
successfully support for their causes”39. The changing nature of opposition and/or civil society 
activity makes clear that there is a growing disconnection between the individual, society and 
the classic boundaries of the ‘Westphalian nation-state’:   
The implosion of the clear distinction between the national and international implies the 
blurring of the classic notions of citizenship, borders and (political) consciousness. The 
consequence of this de-territorialization is the existence and growth of new forms of 
socialization that blur geographical proximities, constitute themselves in cross-national 
networks (virtual or real). Within the site of the still powerful nation-state therefore the 
disappearing traditional boundaries of inclusion and exclusion – formerly readily apparent in 
and logically deriving from national affiliations – are changing and altering. This 
undoubtedly changes the nature, role and even form of politics within the territory of the 
state40.  
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This became clear in (a) the debate on the reform of the moudawanna, (b) the success of 
the Amazigh movement and (c) the creation of a Truth and Equity Commission to deal with 
complaints concerning human rights abuses during the ‘années de plomb’41.  
Central to development and good governance reforms is the role of the middle class. 
Shana Cohen suggests that the Moroccan governments, adapting the country more and more 
to the constraints of integration into the global market, have encouraged individual 
responsibility for employment and social mobility as opposed to the demiurgic role the state 
played in the first decades of post-independency. Therefore, she argues, the new middle 
class42 
no longer takes center stage as a nation’s achievement or, similarly, no longer acts to defend 
its own continuity and stability. The maxim of King Hassan II […] that the state will shape 
better individuals for a better society, has today fallen apart, so that the state is still held 
responsible internationally and domestically for economic growth and joblessness, but the 
individual now must manage his or her own ‘advancement’ distinct from any notion of 
society’ 43. 
A part of this growing group of the ‘new’ middle class has been very active in the 
recently formed civil associations throughout the 1990s. These organisations are very 
different from those that were more or less ‘made’ from above at the end of the 1980s. Back 
then, the makhzen had responded to internal and external stimuli by promoting rapid growth 
of so-called ‘regional associations’ that focused on the region’s economic, social and cultural 
development. All those regional associations were tightly controlled by governmental 
members or people with close connections to the monarchy44. At first sight it looked as if the 
Makhzen was indeed creating its ‘own civil society’ by promoting means of integration for 
the growing urbanized elite, drawing in parts of the growing educated middle classes. This is 
a hypothesis defended by Deneoux and Gateau45. Even if this is to a large extent true, one 
could also argue that these associations had some sort of controlling role over the policy of 
decentralisation that was implemented by the government from the end of the 1980s onwards. 
By 1995 however, new NGOs were formed that did not fall under the direct control of the 
political parties or the makhzen. Associations such as Afak, Maroc 2020, Convergences 21, 
Alternatives, Transparency Internatonal,… are not creations ‘out of nothing’ from ‘above’. 
They are largely controlled by the higher educated younger members of the urban middle 
classes. Indeed, these younger middle class people were disappointed with the policies of the 
traditional parties and therefore turned towards associational life46. 
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Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, the process of reforms has significantly altered the Moroccan polity 
notwithstanding the fact that we cannot speak about a democracy. Reform in the age of 
globalization is foremost based on the belief that market reforms will inevitably lead to more 
wealth and welfare and thus less poverty. Today, this optimistic neo-liberal view on trade as a 
means to achieve progress and development has been securitized to a certain extent. Free 
trade agreements, market reforms, political pluralism, electoral assistance,… all are integrated 
as tools in the framework of the ‘War on Terror’. The neo-liberal idea of wealth creation 
alleviating poverty is doubled with the idea that this poverty reduction ultimately will remove 
the root causes of political violence, terrorism, social unrest and instability. It is too early to 
measure the full impact of the FTA or the reforms according to good governance logic. 
Whether they will be able to alleviate (even partially) poverty is one thing, but is seems rather 
naïve to await political miracles from trade.  
These economic reforms, together with the pluralization of the political sphere, have 
radically changed the rules of the political game even though the King (monarchy and 
makhzen) still hold on to the reigns of power. The multiplication of societal voices—the  
loudest one being the Islamists—has without doubt altered the nature of authority and control 
and therefore also of the nature of challenges to the Kingdom. As Cohen and Jaïdi rightfully 
argue the changing nature of authority has brought the monarchy to a situation where it tries 
to re-establish its political primacy and power in different and new arenas of political conflict 
and mobilization. Rather negatively they conclude that “instead of cultivating arenas for self-
identification and creative expression that compete with radicalism, the state elected to pursue 
a self-destructive, regressive legal process”47. Perhaps, then, rather than a US led policy 
pressing consciously for democratic reform, it is the more diffuse process of globalization that 
has the most significant impact on Moroccan polity.  
At the end of the day, Mohammed VI is trying to incorporate into new practices of 
authority and law-making a complex amalgam of local demands and international constraints.  
While the King  attempts to accommodate the grievances of oppositional political groups, he 
is also trying to secure his own central position in Morocco’s  political system.  At best, it is a 
difficult task; at worst, it may be an impossible one.  
 
                                                          
47
 See Cohen and Jaïdi, op. cit., p.9. 
